Would global patent protection be too weak without international coordination? Would it be too strong with the international coordination mandated by the TRIPS agreement (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights)? I try to answer these questions using a model of patent-setting game between governments. I introduce firm-biased government preferences and trade barriers, and then make use of the estimates of the firm-bias parameter from the political economy literature to proxy for the degree of governments' firm-bias. Then I calculate the range of trade barriers that is sufficient to give rise to under-protection of patents in the global system without international policy coordination in intellectual property rights (IPR) protection. I make the judgment that the true trade barrier between countries very likely falls within this range of under-protection. Therefore, I conclude that there probably would be underprotection of patent rights without international policy coordination. Calibrating the model with data on market sizes and patent counts, I find that requiring all countries to harmonize their patent standards with the equilibrium standard of the most innovative country quite likely leads to global over-protection of patent rights. Therefore, it is quite likely that global patent protection is too strong if TRIPS is fully enforced.
Introduction
The global intellectual property rights (IPR) protection system was given a boost by the implementation of the TRIPS agreement (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights), which started a gradual process of IPR harmonization in 1995. This agreement effectively requires the strengthening of patent protection of many countries, and forces the world IPR protection policies towards harmonization (albeit a partial one). There have been nothing nearly as powerful as TRIPS in its ability to coordinate international IPR protection, not least because of the large number of countries involved (it is under the auspices of the WTO) and its ability to enforce rulings due to the credibility of the threat of punishment through trade retaliation. Given the tremendous repercussions of such a coordinated increase in the strengths of IPR protection, it is fair to ask whether TRIPS is really a solution to a global coordination problem. It is clear that TRIPS has distributive effect between countries. 1 However, the more important question is whether global IPR protection was too weak before TRIPS. If it was, then TRIPS can potentially be globally welfare-improving and therefore potentially make all countries better off. For example, if less developed countries (LDCs)
lose from strengthening of their IPR and developed countries (DCs) gain from it, but the latter's gains outweigh the former's losses, then it can be mutually beneficial for the LDCs to accept (partial) harmonization of IPR standards with the DCs in exchange for the DCs' opening their markets for labor-intensive manufacturing goods or agricultural products from the LDCs. However, if global patent protection was already too strong before TRIPS, then no such synergy exists between negotiations on trade-related IPR and other issues of global trade.
There is no doubt that some countries attempted to coordinate their IPR policies somewhat even before TRIPS, but empirical studies have shown that even as late as 1990, market sizes and innovative capabilities significantly affected variation in the strengths of 1 McCalman (2001) has shown that the US was by far the largest beneficiary, followed by Germany and France as distant second and third beneficiaries. On the other hand, the greatest loser was Canada, followed by Brazil and UK.
patent protection across countries, as would be expected of a world where each country sets its own optimal IPR standard. 2 So, I start with the working assumption that the world was in a non-cooperative equilibrium before TRIPS, and then ask, Would global patent protection be too weak when left to individual governments to decide their own level of protection?
To answer this question, we need to (a) have a theory that explains how the global system of patent protection was determined in a non-cooperative equilibrium; (b) have a theory that explains how the optimal global system of patent protection should be; and (c) develop a sufficient condition for global under-protection (or over-protection) of IPR.
In order to answer (c), we need to explain how a global system of patent protection affects incentives to innovate and how it creates distortions (deadweight losses). Therefore, we need to answer (a) and (b) first. To do so, I modify and extend a model by Grossman and Lai (2004) . In Section 2, I shall concisely re-state their theory. Then, I extend the model so as to more realistically evaluate whether there would be under-protection of IPR in non-cooperative equilibrium.
A second and related question I ask is, Would global patent protection be too strong with international coordination mandated by TRIPS? To answer this question, we need to determine what TRIPS has done in the context of our model. Adopting the views of Reichman (1995) and Lai and Qiu (2003) , I make the assumption that TRIPS requires all countries in the world to set their IPR standards equal to that of the most protective country in Nash equilibrium. The model described in the last paragraph would help us to answer this second question.
In the basic model of Grossman and Lai (2004) , countries play a Nash game in setting the strengths of patent protection. The best response function of a country's government is obtained by setting the strength of patent protection that equates the marginal costs (deadweight loss due to longer duration of monopoly pricing) and marginal benefits (increased incentives of innovation) of extending protection, given the strengths of protection of other countries. Each country conveys positive externalities to foreign countries as it extends patent protection, as it increases profits of foreign firms in the 2 See, for example, Ginarte and Park (1997) and Maskus (2000a) .
home market, and increases consumer surplus of foreign consumers due to induced innovations. As a result, there is under-protection of patent rights in Nash equilibrium relative to the global optimum. In fact, the degree of under-protection in Nash equilibrium increases with the number of independent decision-makers in the patent-setting game.
However, two factors prevents us from directly applying Grossman and Lai's (2004) basic model to answer whether global patent protection would be too weak without international coordination. First, as discussed in the political economy literature, governments may put extra weight on profits as opposed to consumer surplus in their objective functions (e.g. due to firm lobbying). I shall call this firm-biased preferences of governments. When governments put more weight on profits, the marginal cost of patent protection decreases since deadweight loss is smaller. Therefore, patent protection in Nash equilibrium is stronger. Second is the existence of trade barriers. As recent empirical trade literature documents, only a small fraction of firms export to foreign markets. Moreover, the firms that do export have to bear variable trade costs, which include transportation cost and import tariffs. When only a fraction of domestic firms would enter a foreign market, and when there are transportation cost and other trade costs, the positive international externalities of patent protection is diminished. Both firm-bias and trade barriers tend to diminish the degree of under-protection in Nash equilibrium relative to the global optimum. If these forces are strong enough, there may even be over-protection of patents in Nash equilibrium. Therefore, whether or not there is under-protection of patents in the non-cooperative equilibrium is an empirical question. In this paper, I incorporate these two features in an extension of the basic Grossman and Lai (2004) model and derive a sufficient condition for under-protection of patent in the global economy. I then calibrate the model using the firm-bias parameter estimated from the empirical literature and then find out how small the trade barriers have to be in order for there to be under-protection of patents in Nash equilibrium.
In the basic model, we can find a functional relationship between the global strength of patent protection and global welfare. One interesting result arising from the basic model is that requiring all other countries to increase their equilibrium patent standards so as to harmonize with that of the most protective country is never over-protective from the global welfare point view, and thus it is always welfare-improving. In the extended model, whether or not such as harmonization scheme is over-protective depends on trade barriers, the degree of firm-bias and the distribution of innovative capability and distribution of market size among the countries in the world. Calibrating the extended model using data and parameter estimates from the literature, I find that under such a harmonization scheme, the sufficient condition for under-protection is far from satisfied. If such a scheme captures what the TRIPS has done, then TRIPS probably results in over-protection of patent rights in the global economy. This answers my second question. Taken together, the answers to the two questions indicate that though some international coordination of IPR protection is needed, the coordination scheme mandated by the TRIPS may be too strong a dose of medicine.
In section 2, I recap the essence of the basic model of Grossman and Lai (2004) . In section 3, I extend the basic model to incorporate firm-bias and trade barriers. Then, I
proceed to answer the two questions posed above. Finally, I conclude in section 4.
A basic theory of international protection of IPR
The theory described in this section basically draws from Grossman and Lai (2004) .
Noncooperative Patent Protection
In this section, I study the national incentives for protection of intellectual property in a world economy with imitation and trade. I derive the Nash equilibria of a game in which two countries set their patent policies simultaneously and noncooperatively. The countries are distinguished by their wage rates, their market sizes, and their stocks of human capital. The last of these proxies for their different capacities for R&D. We shall term the countries "North" and "South," in keeping with our desire to understand the tensions that surrounded the tightening of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection We do not mean the labels North and South to rule out the application of our analysis to these other sorts of relationships.
The Global IPR Regime
Consumers in the two countries share identical preferences. In each country, the representative consumer maximizes the intertemporal utility function. The instantaneous utility of a consumer in country j is given by
where y j (z) is consumption of the homogeneous good by a typical resident of country j at time z, x j (i, z) is consumption of the i th differentiated product by a resident of country j at time z, and n j (z) is the number of differentiated varieties previously invented in country j that remain economically viable at time z. There are M N consumers in the North and M S consumers in the South. While we do not place any restrictions on the relative sizes of the two markets at this juncture, we shall be most interested in the case where M N > M S . 4 It does not matter for our analysis whether consumers can borrow and lend internationally or not.
In country j, it takes a j units of labor to produce one unit of the homogeneous good or to produce one unit of any variety of the differentiated product. New goods are invented in each region according to
H j is an input whose quantity determines the innovative capability of country j, L Rj is the labor devoted to R&D there. We assume that a N < a S , which means that labor is uniformly more productive in the North than in the South. We also assume that the numeraire good is produced in positive quantities in both countries, so that w j = 1/a j for j = S, N, and hence w N /w S = a S /a N > 1. Define T = (1 − e −ρτ )/ρ, where τ is the product life of a differentiated good.
We now describe the IPR regime. In each country, there is national treatment in the granting of patent rights. Under national treatment, the government of country j affords the same protection Ω j = ω j T j to all inventors of differentiated products regardless of their national origins, where ω j is the probability that a patent is enforced in country j (or the fraction of country j's market where a patent is enforced) at any moment in time,
T j = (1 − e −ρτ j )/ρ, and τ j is the length of the patents granted by country j. In other words, we assume that foreign firms and domestic firms have equal standing in applying for patents in any country and that all patents are subject to the same enforcement provisions. National treatment is required by TRIPS and it characterized the laws that were in place in most countries even before this agreement. 5 In our model, a patent is an exclusive right to make, sell, use, or import a product for a fixed period of time (see Maskus, 2000a, p.36 ). This means that, when good i is under patent protection in country j, no firm other than the patent holder or one designated by it may legally produce the good in country j for domestic sale or for export, nor may the good be legally imported into country j from an unauthorized producer outside the country. We also rule out parallel imports -unauthorized imports of good i that were produced by the patent holder or its designee, but that were sold to a third party outside country j. across national markets.
We solve the Nash game in which the governments set their patent policies once-andfor-all at time 0. These patents apply only to goods invented after time 0; goods invented beforehand continue to receive the protections afforded at their times of invention. So long as the governments cannot remove protections that were previously granted, the economy has no state variables that bear on its choice of optimal patent policies at a given moment in time. This means that the Nash equilibrium in once-and-for-all patents is also a sub-game perfect equilibrium in the infinitely repeated game in which the governments can change their patent policies periodically, or even continuously. Of course, the repeated game may have other equilibria in which the governments base their current policies on the history of prior actions. We do not investigate such equilibria with tacit cooperation here, but rather postpone our discussion of cooperation until a later section.
Let us describe, for given patent strengths Ω N and Ω S , the life cycle of a typical differentiated product. During an initial phase after the product is introduced, the inventor holds an active patent in both countries which is only partially enforced. The 
The Best Response Functions
Consider the choice of patent policies Ω N and Ω S that will take effect at time 0 and apply to goods invented thereafter. The expressions for the aggregate welfare in country i, discounted to time 0, is given by
where Λ i0 is the fixed amount of discounted surplus that consumers in country i derive from goods that were invented before time 0. The second equality arises from the fact that there is zero profit for each firm, so that
π is the value of a new patent.
We are now ready to derive the best response functions for the two governments.
The best response expresses the strength of patent protection that maximizes a country's aggregate welfare as a function of the given patent policy of its trading partner. Consider the choice of Ω S by the government of the South. This country bears two costs from strengthening its patent protection slightly. First, it expands the fraction of goods previously invented in the South on which the country suffers a static deadweight loss of increasing Ω S must match the marginal cost, which implies
where γ j is the responsiveness of innovation in region j to changes in the value of a patent (in elasticity form), i.e.
Similarly, in the North, the marginal benefit of strengthening patent protection must match the marginal cost at any interior point on the best response curve. The marginal cost in the North is different from that in the South, because the North's national income includes the profits earned by Northern patent holders but not those earned by Southern patent holders. The marginal benefit differs too, because the effectiveness of patent policy as a tool for promoting innovation varies according to the importance of a country's market in the aggregate profits of potential innovators and because the surplus from a typical product over its lifetime depends upon a country's patent regime. The condition for the best response of the North, analogous to (3) above, is
Noting that γ S = γ N = γ, 7 the two best response functions can be written similarly 7 The fact that the two supply elasticities γ S and γ N are equal despite the differences in human capital endowments, in employment, and in labor productivity is a property of the Cobb-Douglas
is the share of world innovation that takes place in country It is easy to show using (5) that the best response curve for the South must have a slope that is everywhere greater in absolute value than M S /M N , while the best response curve for the North must have a slope that is everywhere smaller in absolute value than M S /M N . 8 It follows that the curve for the South must be steeper than that for the research technology. It follows from the observation that
North at any point of intersection. This guarantees uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium and ensures stability of the policy setting game.
We summarize the most important findings in this section as follows.
Proposition 1 Let the research technology be
Since the two patent policies are strategic substitutes in both countries, there exists a unique and stable Nash equilibrium of the policy setting game.
International Patent Agreements
In this section, we study international patent agreements. 9 We begin by characterizing the combinations of patent policies that are jointly efficient for the two countries. 10 Then we compare the Nash equilibrium outcomes with the efficient policies, to identify changes in the patent regime that ought to be effected by an international treaty. Finally, we address the issue of policy harmonization. By that point, we will have seen that harmonization is neither necessary nor sufficient for global efficiency. We proceed to investigate the distributional properties of an agreement calling for harmonized patent policies and ask whether both countries would benefit from such an agreement in the absence of some form of direct compensation.
Efficient Patent Regimes
We shall begin by showing that the sum of the welfare levels of the two countries depends only on a measure Q of the overall protection afforded by the international patent value of Ω S . Thus, the best response curve for the South must be steeper than that for the North at any point of intersection, even if these additional segments of the best response functions are taken into account. 9 See also McCalman (2002), who discusses globally efficient patent policies in his two-country extension of the Nordhaus (1969) model. Lai and Qiu (2003) consider whether the joint welfare of the two countries would be increased if the South were to extend its patents so as to be equal in length to those chosen by the North in a Nash equilibrium. 10 Ours is a constrained efficiency, because we assume that innovation must be done privately and that patents are the only policies available to encourage R&D. We do not, for example, allow the governments to introduce R&D subsidies, which if feasible, might allow them to achieve a given rate of innovation with weaker patents and less deadweight loss.
system. This means that the same aggregate world welfare level can be achieved with different combinations of Ω S and Ω N that imply the same overall level of protection.
One particular level of Q-call it Q * -maximizes the sum of the countries' welfare levels.
For a wide range of distributions of world welfare, efficiency is achieved by setting the individual patent policies so that the overall index of patent protection is Q * .
In particular, let Q = M S Ω S + M N Ω N . This measure of global patent protection weighs the degree of patent protection in each country by the size of the country's market.
A firm that earns a flow of expected profits of ω S M S π for a period of length τ S in the
South and a flow of expected profits of ω N M N π for a period of τ N in the North earns a total discounted sum of expected profits equal to Qπ. Thus, Q governs the allocation of resources to R&D in each country, regardless of the particular combination of patent policies in the separate countries.
Consider the choice of patent policies Ω N and Ω S that will take effect at time 0 and apply to goods invented thereafter. Summing the welfare expressions in (2) for i = S and i = N, we find that
The same is true of φ S and φ N . It follows that different combinations of Ω S and Ω N that yield the same value of Q also yield the same level of aggregate world welfare. 12 If international transfer payments are feasible, then a globally efficient patent regime
where Q * is the value of Q that maximizes the right- 11 In country i, the allocation of labor to research is determined by hand side of (6). 13 Notice that a range of efficient outcomes can be achieved without the need for any international transfers. By appropriate choice of Ω N and Ω S , the countries can be given any welfare levels on the efficiency frontier between that which they would achieve if Ω S = 0 and Ω N = Q * /M N and that which they would achieve if
and Ω N = 0.
14 Although aggregate world welfare does not vary with the national policies ω i and τ i as long as M S Ω S + M N Ω N = Q * , the countries fare differently under the alternative combinations of policies that can be used to achieve global efficiency unless compensating transfers take place. In particular, the welfare of the North increases and that of the South decreases as Ω S is increased and Ω N is decreased in such a way as to keep the weighted sum constant. It follows that, absent any international transfer payments, the countries have a strong conflict of interest over the terms of an international patent agreement.
Pareto-Improving Patent Agreements
How do the efficient combinations of patent policies compare to the policies that emerge in a noncooperative equilibrium? The answer to this question -which informs us about the likely features of a negotiated patent agreement -is illustrated in Figure 1 . The figure depicts the best response functions and the efficient policy combinations on the same diagram.
<Figure 1 about here> 13 The first-order condition for maximizing ρ[
The second-order condition is satisfied at Q = Q * . 14 This statement ignores the ceiling on patent lengths imposed by the finite economic life of differentiated products. A more precise statement is that a range of distributions of maximal world welfare can be achieved by varying
In the figure, the efficient policy combinations are depicted by the line QQ. 
The proposition implies that, starting from any interior Nash equilibrium, an efficient patent treaty must strengthen patent protection in at least one country. It also implies that the treaty will strengthen global incentives for R&D and induce more rapid innovation in both countries. 15 If international transfer payments are infeasible, the set of Pareto efficient policy combinations includes the segment of the vertical axis above its intersection with QQ and extending as far as the point (0,T ) and the segment of the horizontal axis to the right of its intersection with QQ and extending to (T , 0).
Patent Policy with Many Countries
In this section, we extend our analysis to a trading world with many countries. Our main finding is that adding countries exacerbates the free-rider problem that plagues the noncooperative policy equilibrium. Small countries are inclined to allow others to provide the incentives for innovation so as to avoid the deadweight losses in their home markets. In the limit, as the number of countries grows large and each one is small in relation to the world economy, the unique Nash equilibrium has universal patents of strength zero. Then, a patent treaty is critical for creating incentives for private innovation.
We assume that there are J countries, and that country i has market size M i , human capital endowment H i , and labor productivity 1/a i . The research technology in country
. All consumers share the preferences given in (1).
Suppose that there is no cooperation between nations in setting their patent policies.
In country i, either Ω i = 0 and the marginal cost of providing the first bit of patent protection exceeds the marginal benefit, Ω i =T and the marginal benefit of providing the last bit of patent protection exceeds the marginal cost, or 0 < Ω i <T and the marginal benefit of strengthening patent protection equals the marginal cost. Equality between marginal benefit and marginal cost implies
where Q = P j M j Ω j measures the strength of global patent protection in the Nash equilibrium.
Observe first that as μ i → 0, the left-hand side of (7) approaches C c − C m ; a small country captures virtually none of the monopoly profits from innovative products, so the marginal cost of a patent per consumer and product is the difference between the competitive and monopoly levels of consumer surplus. But as M i → 0, the right-hand side of (7) approaches zero, because a small country provides innovators with virtually none of their global profits and so worldwide innovation is hardly responsive to a change in such a country's patent policy. It follows that a small country will set its index of patent protection equal to zero in a Nash equilibrium.
If all countries choose positive patent strengths that are less thanT , equation (7) holds for every i. Then we can sum (7) across the J countries, which gives
Then, for a given size of the world market, Q depends only on the number of countries J
and not on the distribution of consumers and human capital across countries. Moreover, the greater is the number of countries, the weaker are the global incentives for innovation in a noncooperative equilibrium. As the number of countries grows large (holding constant the size of the world market), the aggregate incentives for innovation approach zero. 16 Evidently, the free-rider problem becomes increasingly severe as the number of independent decision makers in the world economy expands.
Finally, note that the requirements for global efficiency do not depend on the number of countries. Again, the sum of all national welfare levels is a function of the aggregate world incentive for innovation. This sum is maximized when
Thus, if international compensation is possible, an efficient global patent treaty will have P j M j Ω j = Q * , where Q * is solved from (9) . Notice that Q * must exceed Q, the aggregate patent protection in the Nash equilibrium. Even if international compensation is not feasible, an efficient agreement will have P j M j Ω j = Q * for a range of distributions of world welfare. 16 Suppose Q were to approach a finite number as J → ∞. Then γ would approach a finite number as well, and the right-hand side of (8) would be finite. But the left-hand side of (8) approaches infinity as J → ∞.
Harmonization with the most protective country
We have concluded that global patent protection would be too weak without international coordination. But would it be too strong with the current international coordination, namely TRIPS? One way to characterize TRIPS in the context of our model is that TRIPS requires all other countries to harmonize their IPR standards with the pre-TRIPS standards of the most protective country. A similar view has been expressed by a few observers, such as Reichman (1995) , and the assumption has been used to analyze multi-issue negotiations in the GATT/WTO by Lai and Qiu (2003) . 17 Under this assumption, is such a harmonization scheme going to be over-protective from a global welfare point of view? Suppose we apply best response function (7) to a country k such
that
Suppose we impose the restriction Ω j = Ω * ∀j ∈ N on first order conditions (9) . It is easy to see that if Ω As national patent strengths are strategic substitutes, we can pin down the upper bound of Ω E k by finding the best response of country k, call it Ω k , if all other countries do not protect at all. Invoking (7), we have If globally efficient harmonization occurs at Ω * , then invoking (9) we have
omparing the above two equations, it is clear that Ω * > Ω k . 18 Therefore, we conclude with the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Starting from Nash equilibrium, requiring all countries to adopt the equilibrium patent standard of the most protective country is unambiguously globally welfareimproving.
The above proposition implies that TRIPS increases the welfare of the countries that are most protective before TRIPS but it hurts the countries that are least protective before TRIPS. However, the gains of the former group of countries outweigh the losses of the latter group of countries, as global welfare increases. The situation in a twocountry case is shown in Figure 1 . It shows that global harmonization with the North's pre-TRIPS standard is a movement from point E to point E'. As E' is still inside the global efficiency frontier, global welfare increases. Many commentators (e.g. Reichman 1995) believe that TRIPS is a quid pro quo between the North (the more protective countries before TRIPS) and the South (the less protective countries before TRIPS) in which the former opens their market to the exports of traditional goods from the latter while the latter agrees to harmonize its IPR standards with the pre-TRIPS standards of the former. This observation supports our result here: As the North gains more than the South loses in this global IPR harmonization scheme, the North has incentives to "bribe" the South to harmonize IPR. A detailed analysis of this sort is found in Lai and Qiu (2003) . 18 In Grossman and Lai (2004) , it is shown that if the R&D function is CES with elasticity of substitution between H and L equal to β, then γ = γ(Q, β). When β = 0 (Cobb-Douglas), γ is independent of Q. When β < 0, γ is negatively related to Q. This implies that as long as β ≤ 0, the current result holds. Note that β ≤ 0 (which includes the Leontief case) means that capital and labor are not too substitutable in R&D, which is quite plausible.
Extended model with trade barriers and firm-bias
The conclusion that global IPR protection is too weak in the absence of international agreement can be met with skepticism. Many people point to the strong pharmaceutical lobbies in Washington to justify why they think global patent protection before TRIPS must have been already too strong rather than too weak. Moreover, the existence of trade barriers weakens the international spillovers that one nation confers on foreign countries when it strengthens domestic IPR protection. Therefore, I address here two key simplifications of the basic model: that governments put equal weights on consumer welfare and firm profits and that there are no trade barriers. In reality, governments are often biased in favor of domestic firms and trade barriers are non-trivial. Omitting these factors can bias the conclusion that global IPR protection is too weak in the noncooperative equilibrium. Obviously, whether the conclusion of the basic model can be overturned depends on how large are the magnitudes of these two effects. The analytical task is to find out what values of firm-bias and trade barrier can sustain the original conclusion that there is under-protection of IPR in Nash equilibrium, and then judge whether these values are plausible.
I assume that trade barrier is captured by two components: the export penetration rate, which is the probability that a good is exported to each foreign country; and trade cost, which consists of transport cost and import tariffs. Recent empirical trade literature documents that only a small fraction of firms export. To capture this phenomenon, I assume that each producer of differentiated goods has an exogenous probably θ of exporting to each foreign country. 19 In addition, I assume that there is an iceberg trade cost equal to a fraction t of the production cost, and that there is a constant-elasticity demand curve faced by each consumer, with being the price elasticity of demand.
Defining y = (1 + t) − +1 , then y is an inverse measure of trade costs. To modify the equations of the basic model, we change C m to θyC m and π to θyπ for goods that are traded. 20 Note that we assume that a firm always patent its good in all countries once 19 It is not the purpose of my model to explain why the export penetration rate is a small fraction.
For the purpose of this paper, it suffices to assume the export penetration rate to be exogenous. 20 Let the demand function be x = Ap − , where is the absolute value of elasticity of demand. Let it is developed. Once patented, the technology is disclosed. So, when patents are not in force consumer surplus is C c whether a good was developed overseas or locally, as countries can always imitate foreign-developed goods when the patent is not in force, and these imitated goods are produced locally, and so there is no trade barrier.
21
Let 1 + a be the weight a government puts on domestic profits when a weight of one is put on domestic consumer surplus in its objective function. The parameter a measures the firm-bias of governments. Note that this approach of assigning additional exogenous weight to firms as opposed to consumers is similar to what is done by Bagwell and Staiger (2002). They essentially put a weight of 1 + a on firms in the government's objective function, which they treat as a reduced form derived from the analysis of a political-economy equilibrium a la Grossman and Helpman (1994) . Let v i be the expected value of a patent of an invention by a firm in country i. Therefore,
It is useful to consider a multi-country setting, as the number of independent decisionmaking governments plays a crucial role in whether there is under-protection of IPR in Nash equilibrium. Let there be J countries in the set N of countries in the world. . 21 I assume that an innovator patent his innovation all over the world before he learns to which countries, or whether, he would be able to export. Note that even if it turns out that a good is not exported to a foreign country, nobody in the foreign country can legally produce or sell the good locally while the patent for the good is in force. Under such circumstance, local consumers cannot enjoy the good while its patent is in force locally. When the patent is not in force, local imitators can produce the good with zero imitation cost, and the market becomes perfectly competitive. multi-country setting, the best-response function of country i is It can be easily shown that the first-order condition for global welfare maximization 22 To get some feeling of concreteness, we can look at the two-country case. In Nash equilibrium, the best response functions of the North and the South are, respectively,
with respect to the choice of Ω i is given by
The LHS is the marginal global cost of strengthening IPR protection in that country.
The second term inside the squared brackets is the welfare that will not be taken into and
In the two-country case, the first order conditions for the choices of Ω N and Ω S respectively for Let us define the LHS/M i of the first order condition above as MC 
Is there global under-protection of IPR?
I define under-protection as a situation when, starting from Nash equilibrium, global welfare increases as a result of some positive changes in all {Ω i } i∈N (where the magnitudes of increase are not necessarily equal). The point of the analysis is to come up with a sufficient condition under which, starting from Nash equilibrium © Ω E i ª i∈N , some simultaneous (but not necessarily equal) increases in IPR protection of all countries is globally welfare-improving. Note that an increase in the strength of protection in all countries raises the values of all patents. This increases the global deadweight losses, but
gives a boost to the rate of innovation. To simplify the analysis, I focus on changes in {Ω i } i∈N such that M i dΩ i = dΩ for all i. I want to find a sufficient condition under which such changes lead to an increase in global welfare. In other words, I seek a condition under which the marginal global benefit outweighs the marginal global cost.
First I prove the following lemma:
Proof. A sufficient condition for under-protection is
is, global welfare increases as each Ω i increases slightly such that
This clearly indicates under-protection at Nash equilibrium. Moreover, since
for all i in Nash equilibrium,
= 0 includes the Nash equilibrium as a special case. ¥
To understand Lemma 1 better, let us consider a two-country case. First refer to Figure 2 for an idea of the relationship between Nash equilibrium and global optimum.
In that diagram, point E is the Nash equilibrium while point G is the global optimum.
BRF-S and BRF-N are the best response functions of South and North respectively.
Point G is at the intersection of the curves shown. 24 It is not hard to see that starting from any point on the iso-global-welfare line to the left of GG (defined by
would increase W w . In the context of Figure 2 , a necessary and sufficient condition for there to be under-protection in Nash equilibrium is that point E is to the left of the curve GG.
25 <Figure 2 and 3 about here> Figure 3 shows the relationship between the curves GG and EE (defined by 
Proof. See the appendix. ¥
To check that (J − 1) θy > a is a reasonable condition, note that in the special case of the basic model, when there are two countries (J = 2), θy = 1 and a = 0, the condition 24 Note that the slopes of the iso-global-welfare lines W w = W are always equal to
at their intersection with the line
But at any point on the curve
. 25 Note that if point E is to the right of GG, then any simultaneous small decrease of Ω S and Ω N such that
is satisfied. Moreover, it accords with the intuition that the free-rider problem gets more serious when there are more countries playing the patent-setting game, for a larger J leads to more under-protection. It also is consistent with the notions that trade barriers weaken the cross-border externality of IPR protection, because a smaller θy leads to less under-protection, and that stronger government bias towards patent-holding firms tends to strengthen patents, for a larger a leads to less under-protection.
What is a reasonable value for a? In the political-economy literature (Grossman and Helpman 1994; Maggi and Goldberg 1999), researchers have tried to estimate the weight the U.S. government puts on campaign contributions when it puts a weight of unity on welfare. They rarely come up with a number more than 0.5. Since this is a preference parameter, it should be the same in the context of patent protection. Suppose there is a patent lobby, and suppose there is no consumer lobby, nor is there lobbying from other sectors of the economy. Based on these suppositions, it is easy to show that the value the government puts on campaign contributions is exactly the same as a in our model. What is a reasonable value for θ? Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2004) firms that do not export at all is 0.2. With our assumption, the probability of a firm exporting to n markets is determined a binomial distribution As a final note in this subsection, I recognize that some people may argue that the globally optimal combination of strengths of national patent protection should take into account the politically-augmented objective function of each national government, as these functions reflect the preferences of each government, which represents each country in international negotiations. If maximizing the sum of the politically-augmented objective functions is the goal of international coordination, then one simply remove the term +πaφ i inside the squared brackets on the LHS of equation (11) . In this case, it is 28 Hummels (1999) found that the ad valorem freight rate of machinery and transport equipment for a sample of six non-land-locked countries was around 5% on average (Table 1 in Hummels (1999), Trade
Weighted Average Freight Rate). It was 2% for the US. The average freight rate of one important patent-sensitive good, pharmaceutical, was around 2.5% (it was 1.2% for the US). The tariffs on patent sensitive goods are usually quite low. For example, the tariffs on pharmaceuticals are mostly zero in the US, EU and Japan. They are about 6% in China. The tariffs on machinery are mostly below 2%
in US, EU and Japan. The tariffs on polymerization products are less 2% in US, EU and Japan, and about 6.5% in China.
clear that there is always under-protection of patents in each country, as the marginal global cost is lower than the marginal national cost while the marginal global benefit is higher than the marginal national benefit. There are unambiguous positive cross-border externalities as the increases in profits of foreign firms and consumer surplus of foreign consumers due to induced innovations are not taken into account as Ω i increases, just like in the basic model. The spillovers are smaller in this case, as there are trade barriers.
Harmonization with the most protective country
What is the condition to guarantee that the harmonization scheme described in subsection 2.4 does not over-protect IPR in the global economy? Suppose best response function (10) is applied to country k where
Suppose we sum up all the J first order conditions (11) and impose the restriction Ω j = Ω * ∀j ∈ N on this equation. As Ω * is the globally efficient harmonized patent strength, Ω E k < Ω * is the condition that we are looking for.
As in subsection 2.4, we find the upper bound Ω k of Ω E k , which is the best response of country k given that all other countries do not protect. Applying Ω k = Ω k and Ω i = 0 ∀i 6 = k to equation (10) , and manipulating the resulting equation, we get
Simplifying, multiplying both sides by P j∈N M j and shifting a term to the left hand side, we have
where we have simplified notation by defining P M j ≡ P j∈N M j and
Summing up all J first order conditions (11) and applying Ω j = Ω * ∀j ∈ N , we have
Simplifying and shifting a term to the left hand side, we have
where
Recalling
we get
Proposition 5 A sufficient condition for there to be no over-protection of global IPR by requiring all countries to harmonize their patent standard with that of the most innovative country in Nash equilibrium is
assuming each consumer is faced with a constant elasticity demand curve.
Proof. Assuming constant elasticity demand x = Ap − faced by each consumer, it can be easily shown that C m = π (see footnote 20). Substituting into inequality (15) and manipulating, we obtain (16). ¥ Let us make the (realistic) assumption that the most protective country before TRIPS is also the most innovative, i.e. φ k = max{φ j } j∈N . Assume further that M k is greater than the average market size, i.e. M k > P M j /J, which is realistic. A few observations are in order. First, if θy = 1 and a = 0, then the condition (16) is clearly satisfied. This confirms the result in subsection 2.4. Second, the condition is more likely satisfied if a is smaller or θy is larger. This makes sense as they tend to make global under-protection more likely in Nash equilibrium. Third, as φ k gets closer to P φ j /J, it makes μ k and μ k − ∆ both smaller, which in turn makes the right hand side of (16) smaller, making the condition more likely to be satisfied. 29 In other words, it is less likely for there to be over-protection when the distribution of innovative capability among countries is not too skewed. This makes sense as harmonization with the standard of the most innovative (and protective) country becomes more onerous for the other countries if the most protective country is a lot more protective than the rest of the countries. In general, a condition more stringent than stated in Proposition 4 is required, as it requires not only that patent rights are under-protected in Nash equilibrium, but sufficiently so. are from the website of WIPO. I use data for the thirty most innovative countries except Russia (for lack of market size data). Going beyond the top thirty would not be very meaningful as the thirtieth most innovative country, Greece, only has 17 patents granted 29 First, as φ k gets further away from P φ j /J, it makes μ k larger. But it also makes μ k − ∆ larger.
This can be seen from the fact that μ k − ∆ increases from 0 to 1 − M k / P M j as φ k increases from P φ j /J to 1 (i.e. as the distribution of φ changes from totally even to totally skewed). Second, we need y > 1, which means that aμ k < 1 − μ k . Once this is established, we see that an increase in μ k keeping μ k − ∆ constant, or an increase in μ k − ∆ keeping μ k constant both lead to an increase in the right hand side of (16) . Applying the chain rule, we can conclude that the right hand side of (16) increases with φ k . 30 When φ j is the same for all j, the condition becomes (J − 1)θy > a, which is the same as the condition for under-protection in Nash equilibrium as stated in Proposition 4. When the distribution of φ j is so skewed towards φ k that φ k → 1, it can be easily shown that LHS 13 − LHS 14 ≤ 0, with equality only when y = 1 and a = 0.
to its residents per year by the US Patent Office during 1996-1999.
From the data, I obtain μ k = 0.48 and ∆ = 0.19, and therefore μ k − ∆ = 0.29.
31
With these data inserted into (16), I find that for a = 0.5, (16) is reduced to θy > 2.83 + γ 3.79 + γ .
As before, I assume = 5. I further assume that the labor share of R&D to be b = 0.5, which yields γ = 1. Assuming θ = 0.05 as before, we get y > 16, which is impossible to achieve, as y < 1 is required. 32 As the sufficient condition is so far from being satisfied, I conclude that the distribution of innovative capability among countries is so skewed that requiring all countries to harmonize their patent standards with that of the most protective (and most innovative) country in Nash equilibrium (i.e. the US) likely leads to over-protection of patent rights from the global welfare point of view.
Conclusion
I extend the basic model of Grossman and Lai (2004) by introducing firm-biased government preferences and trade barriers. I make use of the estimates of a parameter from the political economy literature to proxy for the degree of governments' firm-bias. Then I calculate the range of trade barriers that is sufficient to give rise to under-protection of patents in the global system in Nash equilibrium. I make the judgment that the true trade barrier between countries very likely falls within this range of under-protection.
Therefore, I conclude that there probably would be under-protection of patent rights without international policy coordination in IPR protection. It means that the free-rider problem with a large number of independent players overrides the effects of firm-bias and trade barriers, giving rise to too low a rate of innovation in the world.
31 μ k ranges from 0.11 to 1 as the distribution of φ changes from totally even to totally skewed, while μ k − ∆ ranges from 0 to 0.64 as φ changes from totally even to totally skewed. Therefore, the current distribution of φ is somewhere in the middle. 32 To be very conservative and assume that a = 0 and b = 0.1 (which implies γ = 0.11) would yield y > 10.8, still an insurmountable gap.
Does requiring all countries to harmonize their patent standards with the equilibrium standard of the most innovative country lead to global over-protection of patent rights?
To answer this question requires us to know the distribution of innovative capability among countries as well as the distribution of the domestic market size among countries.
Drawing on estimates of these variables for thirty countries, and applying them to my extended model, I conclude that such harmonization quite likely leads to global overprotection of patent rights. Therefore, it is likely that global patent protection is too strong if TRIPS is fully enforced. (obtained from the WIPO website). However, to adjust for home-bias of the US data, we calculate the US innovative capability as the mean of an upper bound and a lower bound.
The upper bound is the yearly average of the actual number of patents granted to US residents by the US patent office, P US US , where P j i denotes the number of patents granted to residents of country i by country j. This is an upper bound because it probably over-states the innovative capability of the US because even relatively trivial inventions might be patented in the US by US residents as the cost of patenting and subsequent working of the patents by domestic residents is relatively low. This is the home bias effect. The lower bound estimate is obtained by the formula
The idea is that American capability to obtain patents relative to that of Japan in
Europe is approximately equal to American capability to obtain patents relative to that of Japan in the US. Comparison with Japan is chosen because its innovative capability is comparable to that of the US while other countries are much further behind. The reason for choosing patents awarded in Europe is because European countries have a longer tradition of patent protection and have been having patent systems similar to that of the US. Japan, on the other hand, has a more liberal patent system with narrower protection than in the US and in Europe. Therefore, calibration with the Japanese patent counts is not done. The estimate g P US US is considered a lower bound of US innovative capability as some useful American innovations are not patented overseas perhaps because they are relatively less significant (but may be still useful). This is just the opposite of the home bias effect.
The estimated innovative capability of the US is therefore calculated as
After taking the above into account, we obtain Table 1 , which shows the patent counts and market sizes of the thirty most innovative countries. It can be easily calculated that 
